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    <title>Home on Denys Kolesnyk</title>
    <link>https://kolesnyk.fr/</link>
    <description>Recent content in Home on Denys Kolesnyk</description>
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      <title>Grey Zone eliminated in Mali together with Russian mercenaries and the FAMa</title>
      <link>https://kolesnyk.fr/post/grey-zone-eliminated-in-mali/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 06 Aug 2024 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://kolesnyk.fr/post/grey-zone-eliminated-in-mali/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;This article was originally published in French on August 6, 2024, on &lt;a href=&#34;https://infoops.fr/posts/grey-zone-elimine-au-mali/&#34;&gt;Info Ops France&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;At the end of July 2024, a military convoy of the Malian Armed Forces (FAMa) supported by Russian mercenaries from Africa Corps (formerly Wagner) was eliminated near the town of Tinzaouatine in northern Mali by fighters from the Strategic Framework for the Defence of the People of Azawad (CSP-DPA). In this fight, the person behind the Telegram channel affiliated to the Russian mercenary galaxy &amp;ldquo;GREY ZONE&amp;rdquo;, nickname &amp;ldquo;Белый&amp;rdquo; (&lt;em&gt;from Russian - White&lt;/em&gt;) lost his life &amp;ldquo;with weapons in his hands&amp;rdquo;, according to the Russians.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Mental Warfare - Russian-style Cognitive Warfare</title>
      <link>https://kolesnyk.fr/post/mental-warfare-russian-style-cognitive-warfare/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 05 Oct 2023 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://kolesnyk.fr/post/mental-warfare-russian-style-cognitive-warfare/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;This article was originally published on January 27, 2023, on &lt;a href=&#34;https://infoops.fr/posts/la-guerre-mentale-la-guerre-cognitive-a-la-russe/&#34;&gt;Info Ops France&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;In March 2021, Andrei Ilnitski, advisor to the Russian Defense Minister, declared that &amp;ldquo;&lt;em&gt;the West, led by the United States, has unleashed a &lt;strong&gt;Mental Warfare&lt;/strong&gt; against Russia, the consequences of which will manifest themselves at least a generation later&lt;/em&gt;&amp;rdquo;.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;In August of the same year, he published an article entitled &amp;ldquo;Russia&amp;rsquo;s Mental Warfare&amp;rdquo; in the military-theoretical magazine Voyennaya Mysl&lt;sup id=&#34;fnref:1&#34;&gt;&lt;a href=&#34;#fn:1&#34; class=&#34;footnote-ref&#34; role=&#34;doc-noteref&#34;&gt;1&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/sup&gt; (&lt;em&gt;from Russian - military thought&lt;/em&gt;).&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Does the Russian warmongering rhetoric hint at the invasion of Ukraine?</title>
      <link>https://kolesnyk.fr/post/does-the-russian-warmongering-rhetoric-hint-at-the-invasion-of-ukraine/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 06 Dec 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://kolesnyk.fr/post/does-the-russian-warmongering-rhetoric-hint-at-the-invasion-of-ukraine/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;img src=&#34;https://kolesnyk.fr/images/russian_invasion_ukraine_bild.jpg&#34; alt=&#34;Russian military build-up near the Ukrainian border, 2021&#34;&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;&lt;em&gt;The original article was published on &lt;a href=&#34;https://denkolesnyk.substack.com/p/does-the-russian-warmongering-rhetoric&#34;&gt;Substack&lt;/a&gt; on December 6, 2021.&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Recently, the information about Russia massing troops near the Ukrainian border and fears of a possible invasion appeared in diverse Western media. The warmongering rhetoric also peaked in the Russian information space. The RAND’s Samuel Charap rushed to publish an &lt;a href=&#34;https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/11/19/ukraine-russia-putin-border-522989&#34;&gt;op-ed&lt;/a&gt; suggesting the change of approach to Russia that Biden&amp;rsquo;s administration has to undertake. He also advocated for Washington shifting the focus from “&lt;em&gt;only on coercing Russia&lt;/em&gt;” to “&lt;em&gt;also push Kyiv to take steps toward implementing its obligations under the Minsk II agreement&lt;/em&gt;”. The Minsk II that he, himself, described as “&lt;em&gt;victor’s peace, essentially imposed by Russia on Ukraine at the barrel of a gun&lt;/em&gt;”.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>France unveils a Cyber Influence Warfare doctrine</title>
      <link>https://kolesnyk.fr/post/france-unveils-a-cyber-influence-warfare-doctrine/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Nov 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://kolesnyk.fr/post/france-unveils-a-cyber-influence-warfare-doctrine/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;img src=&#34;https://kolesnyk.fr/images/parly_burkhard.jpeg&#34; alt=&#34;French Defence Minister Florence Parly and Army Chief of Staff General Thierry Burkhard presenting the L2I doctrine&#34;&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;At a press conference on October 21, French Defense Minister Florence Parly and Army Chief of Staff General Thierry Burkhard presented the &lt;a href=&#34;https://www.defense.gouv.fr/sites/default/files/ema/Doctrine%20de%20lutte%20informatique%20d%25u2019influence%20%28L2I%29.pdf&#34;&gt;Military Doctrine of Cyber Influence Warfare&lt;/a&gt; (&lt;em&gt;Doctrine militaire de lutte informatique d&amp;rsquo;influence - L2I&lt;/em&gt;). The publication of &amp;ldquo;public elements&amp;rdquo; of this doctrine may indicate that France recognizes and assumes the conduct of information operations, including on social media, but also demonstrates that a gap at a doctrinal level that exists in relation to Russia or China is shrinking.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Is Information Confrontation a new Russian concept?</title>
      <link>https://kolesnyk.fr/post/is-information-confrontation-a-new-russian-concept/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 21 Oct 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://kolesnyk.fr/post/is-information-confrontation-a-new-russian-concept/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;With the publication of Russia&amp;rsquo;s new &lt;a href=&#34;https://kolesnyk.fr/post/russia-adopts-a-new-national-security-strategy/&#34;&gt;National Security Strategy&lt;/a&gt; (NSS) last June, some Western experts began talking about &amp;ldquo;informational confrontation&amp;rdquo;. In particular, Michel Duclos of the Institut Montaigne published an &lt;a href=&#34;https://www.institutmontaigne.org/blog/la-strategie-de-securite-nationale-russe-2021-lheure-de-la-confrontation-informationnelle&#34;&gt;article&lt;/a&gt; entitled &amp;ldquo;Russia&amp;rsquo;s National Security Strategy 2021: time for informational confrontation&amp;rdquo;, while Sergey Sukhankin of the Jamestown Foundation &lt;a href=&#34;https://www.la-croix.com/Monde/France-menacee-linfluence-russe-pre-carre-africain-2021-10-19-1201181313&#34;&gt;discussed&lt;/a&gt; information confrontation in the context of the use of the Russian private military company Wagner.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Whatever the case, the word seems to have caught on. So the question arises: Is this a new concept or a new Russian approach?&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Russia adopts a new National Security Strategy</title>
      <link>https://kolesnyk.fr/post/russia-adopts-a-new-national-security-strategy/</link>
      <pubDate>Fri, 16 Jul 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://kolesnyk.fr/post/russia-adopts-a-new-national-security-strategy/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;After around a year and a half of work on Russia&amp;rsquo;s new &lt;a href=&#34;https://static.kremlin.ru/media/events/files/ru/QZw6hSk5z9gWq0plD1ZzmR5cER0g5tZC.pdf&#34;&gt;National Security Strategy (NSS)&lt;/a&gt;, the process was finally completed on June 2 with the publication of Decree No. 400. This document, signed by Russian President Vladimir Putin, replaces the old NSS in force since December 31, 2015.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;The publication of the strategic document was delayed, most likely due to the presidential elections in the United States, which consequently gave rise to the need to assess the positions of the new master of the White House and to adjust certain paragraphs of the document and adapt the language.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Russia and Iran sign information security cooperation agreement</title>
      <link>https://kolesnyk.fr/post/russia-and-iran-sign-information-security-cooperation-agreement/</link>
      <pubDate>Thu, 04 Feb 2021 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://kolesnyk.fr/post/russia-and-iran-sign-information-security-cooperation-agreement/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;On 26th of January, Russia and Iran signed a &lt;a href=&#34;https://mddoc.mid.ru/api/ia/download/?uuid=451cab2c-c651-471b-9e96-35a5793e8053&#34;&gt;cooperation agreement in the field of information security&lt;/a&gt;. The agreement was signed in Moscow during a visit by Iran&amp;rsquo;s Foreign Minister, Mohammad Javad Zarif.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;It should be noted that Russia has signed similar agreements in the past, notably within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Moscow has also concluded similar agreements at a bilateral level, albeit with some differences. These include cooperation agreements in the field of international information security.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>On Reflexive Control</title>
      <link>https://kolesnyk.fr/post/on-reflexive-control/</link>
      <pubDate>Tue, 26 Nov 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://kolesnyk.fr/post/on-reflexive-control/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;In democracies, public opinion lies at the very heart of how society functions and is a factor that influences decision-making by the authorities. However, public opinion can not only exert pressure on the government in decision-making, but the government can also take steps to influence public opinion to support its decision or create support for reform. But with the advent of digital technology and the massive proliferation of the Internet, public opinion can be shaped from the outside, particularly by foreign powers.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Vladislav Surkov on &#34;Putin&#39;s long state&#34;</title>
      <link>https://kolesnyk.fr/post/vladislav-surkov-on-putin-long-state/</link>
      <pubDate>Sun, 17 Feb 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://kolesnyk.fr/post/vladislav-surkov-on-putin-long-state/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;&lt;img src=&#34;https://kolesnyk.fr/images/vladislav-sourkov.jpg&#34; alt=&#34;Vladislav Surkov, Russian political strategist behind &amp;ldquo;sovereign democracy&amp;rdquo; and &amp;ldquo;power vertical&amp;rdquo;&#34;&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;A few days ago, Vladislav Surkov, the man behind the &amp;ldquo;power vertical&amp;rdquo; and &amp;ldquo;sovereign democracy&amp;rdquo; concept of Vladimir Putin&amp;rsquo;s first presidential term, published an &lt;a href=&#34;https://www.ng.ru/ideas/2019-02-11/5_7503_surkov.html&#34;&gt;opinion piece&lt;/a&gt; entitled &amp;ldquo;Putin&amp;rsquo;s long state&amp;rdquo;. In his article, he sets out his views on several topics, including elections, the Russian state, international relations, and other issues.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;He explains that &amp;ldquo;Putin&amp;rsquo;s political machine&amp;rdquo; is only getting bigger, and predicts that within several years Russia will remain &amp;ldquo;Putin&amp;rsquo;s state&amp;rdquo;. He goes even further, referring to &amp;ldquo;Putinism&amp;rdquo; as an ideology of the future. According to him, the Russian political system is not only useful for his country&amp;rsquo;s future but &amp;ldquo;clearly has significant export potential&amp;rdquo;.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Information Warfare according to Col. Komov</title>
      <link>https://kolesnyk.fr/post/information-warfare-according-to-komov/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 23 Jan 2019 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://kolesnyk.fr/post/information-warfare-according-to-komov/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;It is high time to delve into the work of Colonel and Professor Sergei Komov, a Soviet and later Russian theorist who stands as one of the most influential figures in the realm of Information Warfare. The reason for focusing on Komov is clear: despite his significant contributions, he remains relatively unknown, particularly among French-speaking experts.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Komov has authored several articles on Information Warfare, or what he terms the &amp;ldquo;Information Struggle.&amp;rdquo; Today, we explore two of his pieces published in the Russian journal Voyennaia mysl (Military Thought) during the 1990s. While the earliest article I could locate was published in 1994, it is his 1996 article titled &lt;a href=&#34;https://militaryarticle.vibrokatok.by/voennaya-mysl/1996-vm/8775-informacionnaja-borba-v-sovremennoj-vojne-voprosy&#34;&gt;&lt;em&gt;&amp;ldquo;The Information Struggle in Modern Warfare: Theoretical Problems&amp;rdquo;&lt;/em&gt;&lt;/a&gt; that truly captured my attention.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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    <item>
      <title>About</title>
      <link>https://kolesnyk.fr/about/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://kolesnyk.fr/about/</guid>
      <description>&lt;img src=&#34;https://kolesnyk.fr/images/dk_pic.jpeg&#34; alt=&#34;Denys Kolesnyk&#34; class=&#34;profile-photo&#34;&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Denys Kolesnyk is a French geopolitical and information risk consultant based in Paris. He specialises in security and defence issues in Central and Eastern Europe, including Poland, Ukraine, and Russia. In particular he focuses on Information Warfare and influence operations.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;He has worked at the NATO Liaison Office to Ukraine, with Effective Engagement Strategies, and as a consultant for numerous other entities. In 2022, he founded &lt;a href=&#34;https://infoops.fr/&#34;&gt;Info Ops France&lt;/a&gt; — an initiative aimed at improving the informational resilience of French society. Since mid-2023, Mr. Kolesnyk has supported ESN as an &lt;em&gt;ad hoc&lt;/em&gt; FIMI / disinformation expert. He also currently serves as President of the &lt;a href=&#34;https://www.mena-researchcenter.org&#34;&gt;MENA Research Center&lt;/a&gt; think-tank.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>In the media</title>
      <link>https://kolesnyk.fr/media/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://kolesnyk.fr/media/</guid>
      <description>&lt;h2 id=&#34;2025&#34;&gt;2025&lt;/h2&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Article in Revue Défense of Union-IHEDN (France): &lt;a href=&#34;https://kolesnyk.fr/images/RevueDefense_OctNov25_Kolesnyk.pdf&#34;&gt;L&amp;rsquo;Europe après la guerre russo-ukrainienne : quelle place pour la Pologne ?&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Comment for Le Parisien (France): &lt;a href=&#34;https://www.leparisien.fr/international/ukraine/volodymyr-zelensky-peut-il-profiter-de-la-sequence-a-gaza-pour-amener-donald-trump-a-regler-la-guerre-en-ukraine-15-10-2025-KR4PKYJG3RH3PEJHNG3DVMTGWM.php&#34;&gt;Volodymyr Zelensky peut-il profiter de la séquence à Gaza pour amener Donald Trump à régler la guerre en Ukraine ?&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Intervention at TVP World (Poland): &lt;a href=&#34;https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RBC0TCM0xHA&#34;&gt;Macron under pressure: France&amp;rsquo;s political and economic storm&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Intervention at TVP World (Poland): &lt;a href=&#34;https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sCWAc4onJpk&#34;&gt;Palestine recognized by more countries&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;Intervention at TVP World (Poland): &lt;a href=&#34;https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QRKdPBYMyLU&#34;&gt;France Won&amp;rsquo;t Replace U.S. as Security Guarantor, But Aims to Lead on Defense&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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      <title>Services</title>
      <link>https://kolesnyk.fr/services/</link>
      <pubDate>Mon, 01 Jan 0001 00:00:00 +0000</pubDate>
      <guid>https://kolesnyk.fr/services/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;I provide expert analysis in &lt;strong&gt;geopolitics&lt;/strong&gt;, &lt;strong&gt;disinformation&lt;/strong&gt;, and &lt;strong&gt;strategic risk&lt;/strong&gt;, delivering actionable insights. By integrating advanced analytical techniques with deep multilingual and multicultural understanding, I offer clear, data-driven assessments. My services cater to governments, corporations, NGOs, and media organizations, helping them navigate an increasingly complex and uncertain world with confidence.&lt;/p&gt;&#xA;&lt;p&gt;My &lt;strong&gt;geopolitical analysis&lt;/strong&gt; helps clients anticipate risks, understand macro trends, and craft strategic responses to emerging challenges. I provide scenario forecasting, policy advisory, and in-depth analytical notes and situation reports on key regions, including France, Central &amp;amp; Eastern Europe, and Russia.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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